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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to provide a brief analysis of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment (Case 
C-34/09). Traditionally, the EU citizenship has been mainly construed as a status of 
integration into the Member States of the Union: a status of transnational integration. The 
basic claim developed in these pages is that, with Zambrano, the EUCJ moved away from a 
concept of transnational integration to one of genuine European integration, thus fostering 
a new vision, based on the existence of Euro-bonds. 
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1. EU Citizenship as a status of  integration*  
 
A genuine European integration 
Ruiz Zambrano, a judgment of the European Court of Justice of 8 March 2011 
(Case C-34/09), is an ordinary case leading to potential extraordinary consequences for the 
development of EU law. Let me say first where I see the main contribution of this 
judgment. In the case-law of the Court which gave substance to this notion, EU citizenship 
consisted essentially in offering the nationals of the member states the opportunity to act 
on a transnational plane within the Union. Nationals of member states were granted rights 
in order to circulate freely, to be admitted in other member states and to enjoy the same 
treatment as nationals of the host country. They were vested with the power to address the 
authorities of another member state and to claim admission, residence and welfare benefits 
on the same conditions as the nationals of that state. This empowerment was aimed to 
ensure the integration of EU citizens into the society of the host state. The status of EU 
citizen has been mainly construed as a status of integration into the member states of the 
Union: a status of transnational integration. According to this model, an individual is EU 
citizen by the very fact that he/she circulates within the Union and becomes a “quasi-
national” of another member state. Now, what emerges from this case is the notion of 
integration within the territory of the Union taken as a whole. We move from a transnational 
(the fact of being assimilated in another society) and plurinational (the fact of multiplying 
affiliations within the Union) integration to a genuine European integration. The European 
territory as such is the natural place of life and integration for European citizens and their 
families.  
 
‘Illegal residents’ 
Some interesting factual elements of the Zambrano case are worth noting. They 
touch upon the general issue of migration in Europe today. Mr Ruiz Zambrano is a 
Colombian national who decided to leave his country of origin with his family and to seek 
asylum in Belgium. The Belgian authorities refused his application for asylum and 
subsequent applications to have his situation regularized. Despite this refusal and the 
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absence of any resident permit, he and his wife have been registered as ‘residents’ in a 
Belgian municipality and he started to work regularly with a full-time employment contract. 
Since the rejection of his application for residence in March 2006 Mr. and Mrs. Zambrano 
have held special residence permits valid during the duration of the judicial action he has 
brought against this rejection. During this stay, Mrs Zambrano gave birth to two children, 
Diego and Jessica. They acquired Belgian nationality by the fact of being born in Belgium 
and since the parents did not take specific steps to have them recognized as Colombian 
nationals. This is the result of the application of the Belgian Nationality Code at the time of 
the case.  
Their condition is typical of the condition of many migrants in Europe, who are in 
a transitory position, but a position which is intended to persist; they are migrants who are 
recognized and partially included in the administrative and economic life of the country but 
who are not authorized to stay in the territory. Mr and Mrs Zambrano belong to this 
category of people who have been provocatively labelled as ‘illegal citizens’ (by the French 
philosopher Etienne Balibar; see also the work of Enrica Rigo). More importantly for the 
Court in its judgment, the case concerns the children whose identity from a EU law 
perspective is twofold. They are Union citizens as Belgian nationals. And they are dependent 
persons, a fragile population that cannot rely on its own resources. Arguably, the issue of 
the care is an important feature in this judgment.  
 
‘The territory of the Union’ 
Confronted with this case, the Court considers that EU citizenship law precludes 
Belgium from refusing Mr. Ruiz Zambrano a right of residence and a work permit. His 
minor children, who are EU citizens, should not be deprived of the right to stay within the 
territory of the European Union. In other words, deportation of European citizens to 
countries outside the territory of Europe is not permitted. It would amount to an 
“expatriation”. The reference to the ‘territory of the Union’ is a central reference in the 
judgment. This reference is not only the metaphor which designates the sum of the 
physical territories of the member states. It is a normative reference which refers to a new 
common space, a space of distribution of rights and common values. What the Court is 
doing here is to recognize a status to specific categories of individuals – European citizens 
and the persons connected to them as dependents or care-takers. This status is attached to 
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them wherever they happen to be, it does not depend on their physical location. It grants 
them rights to circulate and to occupy the European space. There is a strong normative 
dimension implicit in the reasoning. To reside in Europe means not only to be physically 
located in its territory but also to be granted a number of rights and ultimately to be under 
the protection of certain values of personal welfare and moral security. 
 
2. Shifts in the legal theory of  European citizenship 
 
EU citizenship and mobility 
The first and the most obvious shift lies in the disconnection of EU citizenship 
from free movement. In its first cases dealing with EU citizenship, the Court undertook to 
release the rights of citizenship from the economic considerations attached to freedom of 
movement in the realm of the internal market. The Court freed the mobility of individuals 
from the exercise of an economic activity. But the rights of citizenship were still dependent 
on mobility. This was reflected in Directive 2004/38 which codifies the jurisprudence of 
the Court and which states, in its preamble, that ‘Union citizenship is the fundamental status of 
nationals of the member states when they exercise their right of free movement’.  
Following the Zambrano judgment, one could say that part of the EU citizenship 
regime is now split in two parts. The ordinary enjoyment of EU Citizenship rights 
(residence and non-discrimination) is established on the basis of Article 21 of the treaty 
and Directive 2004/38 and still dependent on mobility. As the Court recalls in a recent 
judgment, “the residence to which [the directive refers] is linked to the exercise of the freedom of movement 
for persons” (Judgment of 12 May 2011, McCarthy, Case C-434/09). However, there are 
‘extraordinary situation’ in which the safeguard of the statute is directly concerned. EU 
citizenship can then be based on Article 20 of the treaty and be released from the mobility 
condition. In the first part of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment, the Court sets aside the 
Directive and decides to ground its decision on the basis of Article 20 TFEU (concealing 
the fact that this provision explicitly refers to the conditions defined by the EU legislator in 
the Directive). On this basis, the Court is able to state that the sole presence of a Union 
citizen in a member state, even if this member state is his/her country of origin, is liable to 
trigger ‘European’ protection. The right of residence of the children is sufficient on its own 
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to grant residence to the parents who take care of them. There is not even the need to refer 
to the fundamental rights of the children, their right to family life. The dispute is entirely 
settled on the basis of the statutory right of residence of the children. In ‘extraordinary’ 
situations, there is no need to refer to ‘fundamental’ rights; EU Citizenship works well on 
its own. 
 
The status of EU citizen 
Another important change concerns the reference to the ‘status’ of citizen of the 
Union. The Court proclaimed that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the member states” for the first time in the Grzelczyk case in 2001. This formula 
enabled the Court to broaden the scope of application of the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality. Since then, in each case where this reference 
was introduced by the Court (Baumbast, Garcia Avello, Zhu and Chen, Commission v. Austria), it 
has always had a residual and procedural function: it was used to legitimize a comparison 
between nationals and non-nationals, as an argument to say that, if they are ‘Europeans’, 
the latter should enjoy the same treatment irrespective of their nationality (Commission v. 
Austria, C-147/03).  
In that case, as already in a previous one (Rottmann, C-135/08), the reference to the 
status of those involved in the case plays a prominent role that differs somewhat from 
earlier decisions. It is presented as the real source of the rights and duties conferred on  EU 
citizens and  their family members. The consequence is that the status in itself has to be 
protected in order to protect the rights attached to it. These rights refer to the rights of 
citizenship (movement, non-discrimination, social integration) but one can also see a 
reference to the fundamental rights protected under the Charter and the ECHR. If taken 
seriously, the combination of citizenship and fundamental rights would have far-reaching 
effect in the broadening of the scope of application of EU law. 
 
Is there a right to the European territory? 
An important part of this short judgment is devoted to examining the possible 
consequences of not granting the right of residence to the parents. The Court relies on an 
‘argument from consequences’. The use of this argument is interesting and must be put 
into context. First of all, this is a response to the argument put forward by the Irish 
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government before the Court, the ‘floodgates’ argument that the granting of a right of 
residence is liable to lead to ‘unmanageable results’, to a loss of control over immigration 
flows. The Court has already responded to a similar argument in a previous case, the Metock 
case (C-127/08). It argued that “the refusal to grant a right of entry to the family members of a Union 
citizen would be such as to encourage him to leave in order to lead a family life in another member state or 
in a non-member country”. In Zambrano, the Court states similarly that “a refusal to grant a right of 
residence and a work permit to the father would lead to a situation where the children would have to leave 
the territory of the Union”. In Metock, the Union citizens involved had circulated within the 
Union. The Court recognized to the Union a competence to regulate the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals. This competence was based on the need to 
protect the freedom of movement of European citizens.  
In Zambrano, the children haven’t circulated within the Union. The EU law 
influence is therefore considerably widened to cover non-mobile citizens. In such 
reasoning, the argument from consequences in terms of individual rights prevails over the 
argument from consequences in terms of state control of immigration. The issue is no 
longer the EU competence in the field of immigration.  The real issue is to know whether 
the right of EU citizens to enjoy the European territory prevails over the state competence 
to regulate entry and access to its territory.  
 
3. The invention of  Euro-bonds ? 
 
Classifications and re-classifications 
The main consequence of the case is the transformation of the status of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano. From asylum seeker, he becomes a ‘quasi’ European citizen. From transitory 
residence and illegal status, he gets permanent and legal residence. Not only that: the Court 
enables him to be granted a work permit in Belgium, to be socially integrated in this 
country. This case illustrates the commutability of personal statuses in Europe. The Union 
has multiplied the statuses conferred to migrants. These statuses are more or less 
protective. This inevitably fosters a phenomenon of re-classifications based on EU law and 
a phenomenon of self-re-classifications by the migrants themselves. One may wonder 
about the exportability of this solution to other types of situations. Is it a case limited to 
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people socially integrated in a European society, having concluded employment contracts? 
Is it a case of ‘care’ limited to situations concerning dependent persons like children? In the 
recent MCCarthy judgment of 12 May 2011, the Court rejects the transposition of this 
solution to the situation of an adult having a family member outside the territory of the 
Union. Is this a retreat of the Court? One has perhaps to distinguish, depending on the 
facts of the case. But, whatever the case, the Ruiz Zambrano judgment remains the one in 
which a new status was given to EU citizens.  
 
Union citizens as Europeans 
European citizenship has so far been presented as a means “to strengthen the protection 
of the rights and interests of the nationals of member states” (Art. 2 of the former Treaty on the 
European Union). The idea was to protect their rights against potential discrimination on 
the part of authorities of the member states. Now, this case highlights another dimension 
of European citizenship, namely the protection of the rights of Union citizens as genuine 
‘Europeans’ committed to the European Union, its territory and its common values, and 
not only to the member states. The Court justifies its solution on the ground that Article 20 
TFEU “precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union [the two 
children] of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights [circulation, residence in another 
member state] conferred by virtue of their status of the Union”. A rather weak justification. The 
strong justification lies in the fact that a deportation from the European territory would 
amount to an “expatriation”.  
It is not by chance that this case benefits mainly a non-European, Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano, a Colombian national. This shows the willingness of the Union to develop its 
own boundaries between individuals, its own notion of membership. The case challenges 
the theory of defining the European citizenship by reference to the nationals of member 
states who circulate within the EU. The theory is required to include all those individuals 
who are integrated in Europe and are willing to develop ties in this territory, including 
nationals of non-member states who contest the borders of Europe set up by the member 
states.  
 
 
From recognition to allegiance  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
39 
In another case, concerning the access to the profession of notary in the member 
states, the advocate general Cruz-Villalón stated that “European citizenship is evolving as a 
direct bond between the citizen and the Union” (Case C-47/08). For the sake of his 
demonstration, he insisted that “the concept of loyalty as an expression of commitment to and 
solidarity with the political community cannot be regarded in itself as a distinctive, exclusive and preclusive 
characteristic of the Member States, such that it inevitably requires the bond of nationality. On the contrary, 
a European citizen is not as such unable to make a commitment of loyalty to the Union… The notary thus 
operates within a framework in which loyalty extends both to the State conferring authority and to the 
Union assuming it, as well as to the other Member States”. Under this interpretation, EU 
citizenship is a mechanism which ensures a transfer of loyalty from one member state to 
another. This model is new. It is not one of recognition of a national by the society of 
another member state, but one of allegiance to another collectivity. Notice however that, in 
this case, the Union is not the final addressee of the commitment of loyalty. It is rather the 
guarantor that assumes the genuineness of the commitments established with different 
member states.  
This mechanism comes into resonance with the new financial mechanism 
established by the Union to safeguard the stability of the euro area and to resolve the debt 
crisis. The Union authorizes the euro area member states to support a member state in 
budgetary trouble by granting financial assistance, but it does not commit itself by issuing 
Eurobonds. Now, the creation of financial Eurobonds may be economically and politically 
hard to achieve. Just in the same way, the creation of individual and symbolic Euro-bonds, 
which emerges at the margins in this singular case, will be legally vain if it is not supported 
by a political and popular mobilization akin to the consensus, was it permissive or not, that 
was at the birth of the setting up of the European Communities and which is more than 
ever imperilled. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                 
* An early and shortened version of the article was published on the EUDO Citizenship website 
